Criminal Law by Smith, M. E.H.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 29 Issue 11 Article 7 
June 2021 
Criminal Law 
M. E.H. Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
M.E.H. Smith, Criminal Law, 29 Dicta 415 (1952). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Nov., 1952
sale was conditioned acquires no right in the property which is valid
as against the claims of the initial seller. There are exceptions to
the rule which the Court recognized where some muniment of title
is by the initial seller placed in the hands of the purchaser on which
a subsequent purchaser relies. In such a case the rule that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss arising from the
culpability of a third person, he whose carelessness or negligence
made the loss possible must bear the loss.
This completes a review of the more important and novel
cases decided in the past year on the subjects assigned. Needless
to say, all of the adjudicated cases are of importance. Only those
in which novel or interesting questions have appeared have been
noted and the omission of any one case from this discussion should
not be regarded as a conclusion of the writer that the omitted case is
wanting in importance, but rather that the issues of law presented,
discussed and applied do not present the novelty which would make
them of interest in this type of paper.
CRIMINAL LAW
M. E. H. SMITH
The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled on approximately
twenty cases in the field of criminal law during the past year. The
majority of these cases have been the usual run of the mill raising
no new points or issues for consideration by our Court. However,
there are eight which deserve comment at this time.
I should like to call your attention to the case of People v.
Dolph.' You will recall that this case had considerable publicity,
and involved one of the councilmen of the City of Denver. Council-
man Dolph was allegedly trafficking in the sale of a liquor license.
He was apprehended and arrested when he received $500 in the
basement of a drug store. As a result, he was charged with confi-
dence game and attempting to obtain money by false pretenses.
The confidence game was disposed of under a common principle and
is not noteworthy in the case. The trial court ruled that there is no
crime of attempting to obtain money by false pretenses and dis-
missed the case. The state appealed and the Supreme Court held
that while the facts showed violations of all concepts of ethics and
decency, still, in the State of Colorado there is no crime of at-
tempted false pretenses since there is no specific statute enacting
it and there was no crime such as this known to the common law
as of 1607.
Both Block v People,2 and Kallnback v. People,3 were cases of
causing death of a person while operating an automobile under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. In the Block case the question was
raised concerning the obtaining of a sample of blood for an alcohol
test while the defendant was unconscious. In the Kallnback case
'239 P. 2d 312, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 17, 1951).
- 240 P. 2d 512, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
1242 P. 2d 222, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 4, 1952).
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a sample of blood was obtained from the defendant for an alcohol
test without the defendant's objection. In both cases it was con-
tended that this was a violation of the defendant's constitutional
privileges against self incrimination under Article 2, Section 18 of
the Colorado Constitution.
While these identical questions had not been raised in Colo-
rado before, as far as our Supreme Court is concerned, the general
rule throughout the United States has been that such a test was not
the defendant's testimony, nor was the test obtained with the use
of any process against him as a witness and the test was proven
as was any other physical fact in the case. Hence, the defendant
was in no way speaking against himself. A few courts have con-
fused the test as testimony. Our Court clearly made the distinc-
tion that the constitutional privilege was intended to prevent a
defendant from being forced to give testimony against himself. Our
Court did not contemplate the exclusions of evidence of physical
facts relating to the defendant, and that the result of an analysis of
a blood sample was not his testimony. This principle is again re-
affirmed by citing the Block case in the Kallnback case.
In Rosier v. People,4 the defense sought by subpoena duces
tecum to obtain all the files concerning the defendant from the
Police Department and the District Attorney. In this case the
defense relied upon Battalino v. People,5 wherein the defendant
had demanded written statements of certain witnesses. The Court
now adopts a statement directly out of Wharton's Criminal Evi-
dence and underlines the same to the effect that, "as to the evidence
in possession of the prosecution, the general rule is that the accused
has no right to inspection or disclosures of the same." The Court
further quotes from the Battalino case and states that the, "grant-
ing or refusal of the accused's request for inspection of written
statements of a witness for the prosecution has been held to lie in
the discretion of the trial court." The Court also quotes from Silli-
man v. People,G to the effect that:
A written confession of the defendant in a criminal
case may be retained by the prosecution officers until such
time as they desire to make use of it. No right of de-
fendant is violated when his motion to inspect the docu-
ment before it is offered in evidence is denied, that right
being accorded him when it is formally offered.
The Court further states:
In this jurisdiction there is neither statute nor pre-
cedent authorizing defendant's counsel to make an exam-
ination or inspection of the People's evidence prior to the
time that it is offered on the trial. Under some most un-
usual circumstances defendant may be entitled to inspect
and examine documents in the possession of the law en-
1247 P. 2d 448, C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 14, 1952).
1118 Colo. 587 (1948).
'114 Colo. 130 (1945).
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forcing officers, but then he first must make a prima facie
showing of their materiality.
This question has been before the Supreme Court at a later date
with apparently a similar ruling in the case of Cassinetti v. Dis-
trict Court of El Paso County, No. 16,762, on which the opinion is
not yet available.
In the case of Tate v. People,7 which involved a charge of mur-
der, the Court quoted from Ryan v. People,8 which had set up the
rule that if there was an error in the instructions in first degree
murder and the jury returned a verdict of second degree murder,
the error was harmless and not grounds for reversal, but in view
of the case of Battalino v. People,9 holding that the trial court
should not instruct on a degree of homicide not sustained by the
evidence, the Court now stated in the Tate case:
We are now inclined to re-evaluate the statement in
Ryan v. People, 50 Colo. 99, 144 Pac. 306, that it was not
prejudicial error to instruct on first degree murder when
the verdict returned was a second degree. When this court
holds in a majority of cases that a trial court should not
instruct on degrees of homicide not sustained by the evi-
dence, then in this case, we must say that by such an in-
struction here, error obtains. The fact that the trial court
gave an instruction on first degree murder when the essen-
tial elements are missing in the proof, it must be said that
the jury could easily infer by the giving of such an instruc-
tion that these elements were present in the case. It pre-
sents a fertile field for discussion among jurors not skilled
in legal technique, for finding a welcome opportunity to
compose differences and agree upon a compromise ver-
dict. We must say that it was prejudicial error under the
circumstances of this case to give the instruction on first
degree murder in the absence of proof of the necessary
elements.
In the case of Eckhardt v. People,10 the court again quoted
from the Tate case and cited most of the above as the law. This
case, incidentally, held that a manslaughter charge and an assault
and battery charge while based on the same facts are not two
degrees of the same crime, but initiate crimes of different classes
and cannot be combined.
In Walker v. People," a murder case, the principle is again
affirmed as set out in Ryan v. People,"-' by stating:
This likewise is true where the error relates to first
degree murder and defendant is convicted of murder of
the second degree as we specifically held in Ryan v. People,
50 Colo. 99, 106, 114 Pac. 306. The contention that the
247 P. 2d 682, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 5, 1952).
50 Colo. 99 (1911).
118 Colo. 587 (1948).
,247 P. 2d 673, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 23, 1952).
'1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 24, 1952).
X upra, n. 8.
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objectionable parts of the instructions may have influ-
enced the jury to compromise their verdict 'rests upon
conjecture, merely, and cannot be entertained. We must
assume that the jury performed their duty intelligently,
and with a correct understanding of the charge of the
court.'
In reading the case we find that at one point the Court does com-
ment that a verdict of murder in the first degree would have been
fully supported by the record so that there apparently were ele-
ments to justify the first degree murder charge, where the Tate
case did not have the elements to justify such a charge.
From the reading of these cases together, it would appear that
we now have a new and modified rule. If all the elements are pres-
ent in the case justifying a first degree murder charge, regardless
of the fact that there may be an error in the first degree instruc-
tions and a second degree murder verdict results, such error is
harmless. On the other hand, if any elements of the first degree mur-
der charge are lacking such instruction would be reversible error.
In McBride v. People, the Supreme Court extended the facts
of confidence game as basically shown in Munsell v. People,13 to
cover a series of checks given by the defendant wherein he knows
that the checks are short and held that it was a part of a scheme
to defraud, thus making the checks bogus, and coming within the
confidence game statute. The Court held further that the intent of
the defendant rather than the means used in obtaining the money is
the primary issue of the offense.
EQUITY, WATER, OIL AND GAS
FRANK F. DOLAN
EQUITY
Rand v. Anderson:' The plaintiff, mother of the defendant,
filed the action to rescind an alleged oral agreement whereby he had
agreed to support and maintain her for the remainder of her life,
and to set aside a deed of conveyance in joint tenancy to her son
and herself. The defendant, among other defenses, denied the ex-
istence of the alleged oral agreement and alleged the execution of
conveyance in joint tenancy to have been a voluntary gift on the
part of the plaintiff and the expenditure of large sums by him in
improving the property, and prayed for partition of the premises,
or, in the alternative, if decree of rescission be granted, then that
plaintiff be required to reimburse him for the monies he advanced
and disbursed in reliance on his interest according to the deed.
The lower court found generally for the plaintiff, however, it en-
tered judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the
monies paid out by him for improving the property less an amount
charged against him for use and occupancy of a room occupied by
him and his wife until the time they had removed from the prop-
" 122 Colo. 420, 222 P. 2d 615 (1950).
11951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 28, 1952).
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